The study of quantum cryptography and quantum non-locality have traditionnally been based on two-level quantum systems (qubits). In this paper we consider a generalisation of Ekert's cryptographic protocol [20] where qubits are replaced by qutrits. The security of this protocol is related to non-locality, in analogy with Ekert's protocol. In order to study its robustness against the optimal individual attacks, we derive the information gained by a potential eavesdropper applying a cloning-based attack.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography aims at transmitting a random key in such a way that the presence of an eavesdropper that monitors the communication is revealed by disturbances in the transmission of the key (for a review, see e.g. [21] ). Practically, it is enough in order to realize a cryptographic protocol that the key signal is encoded into quantum states that belong to incompatible bases, as in the original protocol of Bennett and Brassard [4] . In 1991, Ekert suggested [20] to base the security of quantum cryptography on non-locality, and therefore to encrypt the key signal into the incompatible qubit bases that maximise non-locality as revealed by Bell or CHSH inequalities [14] . Recently, it was shown that the tests of non-locality can be made more sensitive for entangled qutrits (3-dimensional systems) than entangled qubits [12, 15, 22] . Also several qutrit-based cryptographic protocols were shown to be more secure than their qubit counterparts [2, 5, 11 ]. It appears therefore very tempting to investigate the performances of a generalization of Ekert's protocol relying on the non-locality of a pair of entangled qutrits instead of qubits.
In what follows, we shall analyze the security of this entangled-based cryptographic protocol against individual attacks (where Eve monitors the qutrits separately). To do this, we will consider a fairly general class of eavesdropping attacks that are based on (state-dependent) quantum cloning machines. This yields an upper bound on the acceptable error rate, which is a necessary condition for security against individual attacks (higher error rates cannot permit to establish a secret key using one-way communication).
The four maximally non-local qutrit bases
In the Ekert91 protocol [20] , the four qubit bases chosen by Alice and Bob, the authorised users of the quantum cryptographic channel, are the four bases that maximize the violation of the CHSH inequalities [14] . They consist of two pairs of mutually conjugate bases 1 . When representing these four bases on the Bloch sphere, their eight component states form a perfect octogon. Similarly, there exists a natural generalisation of this set of bases in the case of qutrits [17] . In analogy with the CHSH bases, which belong to a great circle, these bases belong to a set of bases parametrized by a phase φ on a generalized equator, which we shall from now on call the φ-bases. The expression of these φ-bases in the computational basis {|0 , |1 , |2 } is:
Actually, we can rewrite this transformation as follows:
with l = 0, 1, 2. Obviously, these basis vectors form an equilateral triangle on a great circle centered in |1 . When φ varies, these triangles turn around |1 . It has been shown that when local observers measure the correlations exhibited by the maximally entangled state
in the four φ bases that we obtain when φ i = 2π 12
· i (with i = 0, 1, 2, 3), then degree of nonlocality that characterizes the correlations is higher than the degree of non-locality allowed by Cirelson's theorem [13] for qubits, and also higher than for a large class of other qutrit bases. This can be shown by estimating the resistance of non-locality against noise [22] , or by considering generalisations of the CHSH inequality to a situation in which trichotomic observables are considered [12, 15] , instead of dichotomic ones as for the CHSH inequalities. Note that the states of the four maximally non-local qutrit bases form a perfect dodecagon, which generalizes the octogon encountered in the qubit case.
1 By definition, two orthonormal bases of an N-dimensional Hilbert space are said to be mutually conjugate if the norm of the scalar product between any two vectors belonging each to one of the bases is equal to
Let us now assume that the source emits the maximally entangled qutrit state |φ + 3 and that Alice and Bob share this entangled pair and perform measurements along one of the maximally non-local bases described in the previous section. It is easy to check that |φ + 3 may be rewritten as |φ
where
Therefore, when Alice performs a measurement in the φ basis (|l φ ) and Bob in its conjugate basis (|l * φ ), their results are 100 % correlated. It is easy to check that the maximally non-local bases defined above are two by two 100 % correlated. This can be understood as follows: phase conjugation corresponds to a symmetry that interchanges the bases of the dodecagon.
For this reason, it is natural to consider the generalization of the Ekert91 protocol for qutrits, which we shall denote the 3-dimensional entangled-based (3DEB) protocol. In this protocol [18] , Alice and Bob share the entangled state |φ + 3 and choose each their measurement basis at random among one of the four maximally non-local qutrit bases (according to the statistical distribution that they consider to be optimal). Because of the existence of 100 % correlations between the maximally non-local bases, a fraction of the measurement results can be used in order to establish a deterministic cryptographic key. The rest can be used in order to detect the presence of an eavesdropper, as we shall show in the following. Let us now study the security of this protocol against optimal individual attacks.
Individual attacks and optimal qutrit cloning machines
We use a general class of cloning transformations as defined in [9, 10] . If Alice sends the input state |ψ belong to an N-dimensional space (we will consider N = 3 later on), the resulting joint state of the two clones (A and B) and of the cloning machine (C) is
is an "error" operator: it shifts the state by m units (modulo N) in the computational basis, and multiplies it by a phase so as to shift its Fourier transform by n units (modulo N). We also define the N 2 generalized Bell states for a pair of N-dimensional systems as
with m and n (0 ≤ m, n ≤ N − 1) labelling these Bell states. Tracing over systems B and C (or A and C) yields the final states of clone A (or clone B): if the input state is |ψ , the output clone that is resent to Bob and the ouput clone conserved by Eve are in a mixture of the states |ψ m,n = U m,n |ψ with respective weights p m,n , and q m,n :
q m,n |ψ m,n ψ m,n |
where the weight functions of the two clones (p m,n and q m,n ) are related in the following way:
where a m,n and b m,n are two (complex) amplitude functions that are dual under a Fourier transform [9] :
Let us now assume that Eve clones the state of the qutrit that is sent to Bob (represented as the ket |ψ in Eq. 6), and resends the imperfect copy (labelled by the index A) to Bob. Then, in analogy with [5] , Eve will measure her clone (labelled by the index B in Eq. 6) in the same basis as Bob (the φ basis) and her ancilla (labelled by the index C) in the conjugate basis (the φ * basis). For deriving Eve's information, we need first to rewrite the cloning transformation in these bases. By straightforward computations we get, when φ is equal to zero, that:
where, by definition,
and
where the tilde subscript refers to the new (φ and φ * ) bases. After substitution in Eq. 6, we get:
where we the new amplitudes are defined asã n,−m = a m,n . We are interested in a cloning machine that has the same effect when expressed in the four maximally non-local bases, so to say when φ i = 2π 12
· i(i = 0, 1, 2, 3). This imposes strong constraints on the amplitudes a m,n . It can be shown that the cloner that clones equally well the four maximally non-local bases must be defined by an amplitude matrix a mn of the form:
It is possible to check that, in analogy with the qubit case [7] , such a cloner is phase-covariant, which means that it acts identically on each state of the φ-bases. In particular, the identity (15) can be shown to hold for all values of φ. The deep reason for this property is, roughly speaking, that if the cloner remains invariant when expressed in several bases, then it means that certain combinations of Bell states possess several Schmidt bi-orthogonal decompositions. It is well-known that when at least two such decompositions exist for a bipartite pure state, then there exist infinitely many of them. This explains why requiring a same cloning fidelity in two maximally non-local bases (φ i = 2π 12
· j(i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3, i = j)) implies phase-covariance (i.e., φ arbitrary). A proof of this property is out of the scope of the present paper.
Let us now evaluate the fidelity of this phase-covariant cloner for qutrits, along with the information that Bob and Eve can get about Alice's state. The fidelity of the first clone (that sent to Bob) when copying a state |ψ can be written, in general, as
Of course, the same relation can be used for the second clone (that kept by Eve) by replacing a m,n by b m,n . For the cloning machine defined in Eq. (16), it is possible to compute the values of the fidelities by a straightforward but lenghty computation. It can be shown that they do not depend on φ, that is,
The disturbances D A1 and D A2 of the first clone, defined respectively as l φ+ yield both x 2 + y 2 + z 2 . Making use of Eq. (11), we obtain that, for the second clone, the states of the maximally non-local bases are all copied with a same fidelity (and same disturbances), and that the disturbance is minimal when y = z. Then, F B = (v 2 + 2x 2 + 12y 2 + 8xy + 4vy)/3 and D B1,2 = (v 2 + 2x 2 + 3y 2 − 4xy − 2vy)/3. We must now find what is the optimal strategy for Eve. In virtue of the phase-covariance, and in order to simplify the notations, we shall from now on omit the labels that refer to the particular bases in which the measurement is carried out (actually to particular values of φ). After substitution in Eq. (6), we get
jn . Now,ã m,n = y + δ n0 ((v − y)δ m0 + (x − y)(δ m1 + δ m2 )) so that c m,j = (3yδ j0 + (v − y)δ m0 + (x − y)(δ m1 + δ m2 )). Therefore,
After Alice (or Bob)'s measurement basis is disclosed, Eve's optimal strategy can be shown [5] to be the following: first she measures both her copy B and the cloning machine C in the same basis as Bob, the difference (modulo 3) of the outcomes simply giving Bob's error m.
Conditionally on Eve's measured value of m (i.e., conditionally on Bob's error), this information can be expressed as
In average we get that
Of course, one also has
We now use a theorem due to Csiszár and Körner [16] , which provides a lower bound on the secret key rate, that is, the rate R at which Alice and Bob can generate secret key bits via privacy amplification: if Alice, Bob and Eve share many independent realizations of a probability distribution p(a, b, e), then there exists a protocol that generates a number of key bits per realization satisfying
In our case, I AE = I BE ; it is therefore sufficient that I AB > I AE in order to establish a secret key with a non-zero rate. If we restrict ourselves to one-way communication on the classical channel, this actually is also a necessary condition. Consequently, the quantum cryptographic protocol above ceases to generate secret key bits precisely at the point where Eve's information attains Bob's information. For the optimal cloner, we need to evaluate what is the maximal fidelity F A (minimal error rate) for which a cloning machine exists such that I AE > I AB .
In contrast with the case of the phase-covariant qubit cloning machine [7] , the problem must be solved numerically. Numerically, we obtain that this point is at F thr. A ≃ 0, 7733, actually the same result as for the universal cloning machine, the one that clones equivalently all the qutrit bases [5] . This result clearly shows that the 3DEB protocol is more robust than its qubit counterpart against optimal incoherent attacks, since the optimal qubit phase-covariant cloning machine has the fidelity F 
Conclusions
The Ekert91 protocol and its qutrit counterpart, the 3DEB protocol, involve bases of encryption for which the violation of "local realism" is maximal (i.e., the maximally non-local bases).
Thanks to the presence of perfect correlations, Alice and Bob can communicate key information to each other with non-zero probability. After a sequence of measurement is performed on each member of a sequence of maximally-entangled qutrit pairs, Alice and Bob can reveal on a public channel what were their respective choices of basis and identify which trit was correctly transmitted. They can use the rest of the data in order to check that it does not admit a local realistic simulation, as in Ekert's original scheme [20] . For instance they can check that their correlations violate generalised Bell or CHSH inequalities. As the resistance of nonlocality against noise is maximal when the maximally-entangled qutrit pair is measured in the maximally non-local qutrit bases (and is higher than all what can be achieved with qubits), the 3DEB protocol is optimal from the point of view of the survivance of non-local correlations in a noisy environment.
Actually, it is easy to show that the violation of generalised Bell inequalities is guaranteed provided [12, 15] that the fidelity F A that characterizes the communication channel between Alice and Bob (detectors included: 1-F A is the effective error rate in the transmission) is larger than ≃ 0.854 in the case of qubits [13, 14, 21] ). Note that when this violation occurs, the security of the protocol against individual attacks is necessarily guaranteed, in virtue of the results established at the end of the Section 3.. Therefore, the violation of Bell inequalities is thus a sufficient condition for security, as it implies that Bob's fidelity is higher than the security threshold. For qubits, this sufficient condition was also necessary [21] .
In addition, the violation of Bell inequalities guarantees that the 3DEB protocol is protected against so-called Trojan horse attacks during which the eavesdropper would control the whole transmission line, and replace the signal by a fake, predetermined, signal that mimicks the quantum correlations. Such an attack can be thwarted when the signal is encrypted in the maximally non-local bases provided the noise level is low enough so that no such local realistic simulation of the signal does exist, and provided Alice and Bob perform their respective choices of bases independently and quickly enough [19] in order that their measurements are distinct events, separated by a negative Minkoskian distance (spacelike vector). Note that it is easy to show that all the protocols in which mutually conjugate bases only are involved but with no entanglement (such as the BB84 [4] , the 6-state [8, 1] and 12-state [2] protocols) admit a local realistic model, so that they are not secure against Trojan horse attacks.
In summary, our analysis confirms a seemingly general property that qutrit schemes for quantum key distribution are generally more robust against noise and more safe than the corresponding qubit schemes.
Note: After completion of this work, a related and independent paper on a similar topic has been posted on the quant-ph preprint server [23] . The approach was different in the following sense: in our approach, we assume that Eve clones the state of the qutrit that is sent to Bob according to Eq. 6, which is not the most general possible transformation, and then we impose covariance in order to fix the parameters a m,n . In [23] , a more general transformation is postulated from the beginning, but extra-constraints are imposed. We checked that our (optimalised) cloning machine satisfies these constraints. Nevertheless, a small discrepancy remains between our results and theirs (we obtain: F ≃ 0, 7753). This discrepancy could be due to numerical approximations or to an implicit hypothesis of existence in their case that is not necessarily fulfilled by realistic clonong machines. Our approach being constructive, we obtain directly an explicit form for the cloning machine which is not the case in conventional approaches.
